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SPECIAL LEGISLATION: ANOTHER TWILIGHT
ZONE
By FRANK E. HORACK' and MATTHEW E. WELSH**
(Continued from the December Journal)
III
The judicial treatment of classification as a problem of
population-differences distorts the true relation existing be-
tween cities of the same and different populations. Likewise,
it disguises the real stimulus for special legislation. Special
acts are passed because special interests wish special privileges.
They gain these special privileges by drafting bills which will
not jeopardize the interests of other communities. The special
act avoids all interference.57 Some special interests are, of
course, meritorious. Where the needs of particular communi-
ties differ in character and amount there is reason for special
treatment; the court recognized this when it said "in many
cases local laws are necessary because general ones can not
be properly and justly applicable." 58 The question is "Is
population a test of necessity?" Theorization on this question
is not useful. The actual community differences must be
studied in relation to population and the problem of service
and protection, area and the problem of supervision, property
valuation and the problem of taxable wealth, governmental
receipts and the problem of fiscal administration. To date
the court has assumed, apparently, that population differences
adequately reflect differences in these other community char-
acteristics and thus are adequate guides to the system of
special treatment. 59 The accuracy of this assumption is our
present concern.
* Frank E. Horack, Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
** Matthew E. Welsh, Graduate Student at the University of Chicago.
Editor's Note: The name of Matthew E. Welsh, joint author, was errone-
ously omitted in the December Journal. Ed.
57 "The general rule of legislation (was) that 'any member could have
what his own people wanted."' Board, etc. v. Bringhom, supra n.
G8 Gentile v. State, supra n. 9.
59 On the problem of accuracy in evaluating local activities, see, Sly, "A
Working Plan for Local Government in West Virginia," "Measuring Your
City," Bureau for Government Research, West Virginia University, Public
Affairs Bulletins 6, 2.
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Population and Area
Two of the major factors in the cost of local government
and the need for special services are population and area.
Either factor expressed alone, however, is likely to be mis-
leading. A county's population may be large, but expressed
without reference to density may distort the community's
needs in terms of welfare, sanitation, unemployment, police
and fire protection, and education. Likewise, population un-
related to area conceals inequalities in the tax burden which
arise from highway constructions, maintenance cost, and the
fixed charges of highway indebtedness. Even area and popu-
lation without other more precise factors may be misleading.
The miles of hard-surfaced roads, the proportion of high-
ways in urban and rural areas and the problems of topo-
graphy influence sharply governmental expenditures. 0 But
even without these factors, a comparison of area and popula-
tion illustrate the distortion.
Ten Indiana counties with rather similar populations illus-
trate the difficulty.61
AREA DIFFERENCES IN A SINGLE POPULATION GROUP
o0
Population (in %) ............ 93 94- 95 97 100 100 102 102 106
Area (in %)* ...................... 75 44 94 69 100 84 77 64 66
*Putnam County used as 100%.
Inspection of the above chart will disclose that a relatively
uniform population group becomes a diverse area group. The
6o Great Britain has in granting financial aid to local communities consid-
ered by carefully developed formulas these additional factors. The precision
of their operation suggests a state of development unknown in America. See,
Webb, Grants sn Aid, (London, Longmon Green, 1911); Horack, Federal-
State Cooperation for Social Security; The Grant in Aid", 30 Il. L. Rev. 292,
at 300-304 (1935).
01The materials used in the charts and graphs have been taken from
the following sources: United States Census (1930), Statistical Report, State
of Indiana (1934); State of Indiana, Report, Committee on Governmental
Economy (1935).
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area factor alone can hardly be ignored in light of rural police
protection, highway maintenance and like problems. Thus,
to evaluate the need for special treatment by population alone
frequently is unreasonable. The court has already said in
other cases "there can be no real difference between a county
having a population of 24,000 and one having 26,000," yet
it is possible that the need of Fayette county with a population
of 19,200 and an area of but 216 square miles might differ
sharply from the needs of Rush county with a population of
19,400 and an area of 406 square miles. Nor are these the
only factors-the discrepancy is noted only to indicate the
unreliability of the population test. Any attempt to determine
the need for special treatment by any arbitrary selection of
factors is clearly hazardous.
Further inconsistencies likewise appear. Wide discrepancies
in population do not necessarily reflect wide discrepancies in
area. This, of course, is patent from even a superficial obser.
vation of the state. Three representative counties selected
from four distinct population groups-rural counties, counties
predominately rural, urban counties and counties predominate-
ly urban-indicate the distortion which population classifica-
tion creates.




Population (in %)%.. 23 23 32 94 97 100 172 174 175 553 715 784
Area (in %) .......... 67 33 38 44 69 100 83 94 86 48 132 95
*Putnam County used as 100%.
A comparison of Putnam and Vanderburg is perhaps most
illustrative of the lack of correlation of population and den-
sity. Vanderburg with five and one-half times the population
of Putnam has but one-half the area. St. Joseph with a similar
area has nearly eight times the population. Counties with
lesser population do not have proportionally smaller area.
Indeed, there is in the disparity of population groups a rela-
tive uniformity in area. This is but an example of tradition,
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convenience, custom, and vested interest which a generation
of transportation developments has been unable to disturb.
Population and Valuation
So long as direct property taxation provides the major
source of local governmental income, classification of cities
and counties without reference to taxable wealth produces
irrational effects upon tax burdens. And, as almost every local
act effects the tax rate, the need for exact standards in the
field of special legislation is apparent.
Taxation is the price of service and most special acts en-
large the ambit of governmental activity and thereby increase
governmental costs. 62 Thus, if cities and counties are classi-
fied in accordance with population alone, untoward conse-
quences to taxable wealth may result. Likewise, valuation
alone might be a discriminatory classification, for the concen-
tration of population may impose community responsibilities
in excess of proportionate property value. Neither standard
is sufficient in and of itself. Nothing demonstrates this so
clearly as a comparison of population and valuation in certain
typical Indiana counties.*
In the rural, predominately rural, and the small urban
counties property valuation apparently bears no relation to
population and only slight relation to area. Thus, Brown and
Union counties with almost identical populations have prop-
erty valuation of two and a quarter and eleven million dollars
respectively. Likewise, Jefferson and Rush each with ap-
proximately nineteen thousand population have property valu-
ations of twelve and thirty million respectively. And this
62 But taxation in terms of either population or valuation may be subject
to misinterpretation: " the citizen, has, moreover, acquired numerous
formulas The most widely known of these is probably this: Good
government varies inversely as the tax rate. . . . It is increasingly clear
that such comparisons will not do. . . . It is not tax rates, bond issues,
per capita cost or excessive services that at bottom trouble the citizen-it is the
disturbing feeling . . that the tax dollar is only sixty per cent efficient . . .
.. it emphasizes that the public dollar must be made to do more, . .
it stimulates a search for the measuring stick that will tell conclusively when
it is doing more." Sly, "Measuring Our Cities", supra n. 63.
*See page 187.




although the difference in area is but forty-five square miles.
Similar differences exist between Greene and Cass except that
Greene with a smaller valuation has an area thirty per cent.
greater than Cass. In sum, population is no index of the
taxable wealth of these counties.
Likewise, the ratio of population-increase charts no course
for the increase in taxable wealth. The population differences
of the sparsely and moderately populated counties reflect no
similar differences in property valuation. Apparently, how-
over, once the concentration of population passes a particu-
lar point, population is a factor which influences valuation
rather directly.*
Thus, while population as a guide to valuation is inaccurate
in the sparsely populated counties it is fairly reliable in
counties of great population density. But even this conclu-
sion is largely of negative value. Classification of counties
by the single standard of population is unsafe when the pro-
posed legislation involves the expenditure of money or the
alteration of the tax base or the debt burden.63
Population and Other Factors Effecting Classification
As has already been suggested not only do population, area,
and valuation affect the form, manner, and cost of government
but many other factors contribute, as well. An attempt to
enumerate specifically varying governmental factors would too
greatly prolong this study. Reference to governmental ex-
penditures (as reflective of these other factors) must suffice.
A comparison of expense to population and valuation, not
only raises doubt concerning the frequent generalization that
government in large areas costs less, 64 but also casts doubt
upon the advisability of uncritical special legislative treat-
ment of local governmental problems.**
63 See Burke, "Yardsticks for Social Planning" W. Va. State Planning
Board, Bull. 1. (1935).
64 "Good government is not necessarily identified with large areas and
uniform structures, but it is everywhere identified with the efficient allocation
of services, the effective control of expenditures, the equitable treatment of the
taxpayers, and a carefully guarded credit rating". "Local Government in
New Jersey." (Princeton Local Government Survey, Bull. No. 1, 1936.)
0 See page 188
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COMPARISON OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPENDITURES, PROPERTY
VALUATIONS AND POPULATION IN TYPICAL COUNTIES
Ratio of Expenditures
Exp. to Val. Per Person
County (in percent) Population (in dollars)
Brown ............................................ 4.09 5. 17.80
Crawford ...................................... 3.0 10.1
M artin ............................................ 2.71 10.1
H arrison ........................................ 2.63 17.2
Ohio ................................................ 2.19 3.7
Clay ................................................ 1.7 26.4
Jennings ........................................ 1.6 11.8
Posey .............................................. 1.6 17.8
Laporte .......................................... 1.57 60.5
Jefferson ........................................ 1 5 19 1
Lagrange .................................... 1. 13.1
K osciusko ...................................... 1. 27.4
M ontgomery .................................. 1. 26.9
A dam s ............................................ 1. 19.9
Clark .............................................. 1. 30.7
Porter ............................................. . .39 22.8
U nion ............................................... 86 5.8
W hitely ........................................... 83 15.8
Johnson ......................................... 8 21.0
Vanderburg .................................. 8 113.3
Note that the ratio of expense to valuation cuts across all
population groups, leaving considerable speculation concern-
ing the uniformity of governmental costs, the efficiency of
governmental service, and the justification of particular tax
rates. A comparison of these two columns with the column
on expenditure per person only serves to further remove the
problem of local governmental expense from the field of gen-
eralization. Accurate and fair criticism of tax expenditures
must be predicated upon the particularization of expenditure,
the establishment of functionalized accounting, the compari-
son of varying community activities and responsibilities. And
in this process it should not be over-looked that many of the
discrepancies in community costs result from previous special
legislation which has granted special benefit and likewise im-
posed special burdens.
Although population appears entirely inadequate as a single
standard for the classification of cities and counties, in par-
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ticular instances adequate and justifiable special legislation has
been predicated upon population classifications. But this does
not substantiate the merits of population classification. 5
The use of a population classification has been at best a
subterfuge. Unfortunately, both the legislature and the ju-
diciary have participated in the system. And it has become
a vicious circle. Isolation of responsibility seems impossible
for each has stimulated unjustified action on the part of the
other. Classifications have been both sanctioned and destroyed
by the courts. The legislature in turn has only become more
circumspect in the methods of classification and when neces-
sary has hurriedly enacted legalizing acts in order to protect
administrative action taken under statutes of doubtful con-
stitutionality.6 6 The responsibility is clearly dual, and until
both the court and the legislature consider substance rather
than form, the absurdity of legislative hocus-pocus judicially
sanctioned will continue unabated.
IV
Admitting the inadequacy of ouir present method, is there
a better one? It is submitted that within our own consti-
tutional history there is precedent for an improved legisla-
tive and judicial technique.
The Constitutional Convention of 1852
Dissatisfied with the operation of the state government,
the convention was disturbed, particularly, by the ignominious
record of the legislature. With approximately 90 per cent
65 Frequently, the most arbitrary classification, judged by population stand-
ards will be justified because of the coincidence of other equally important
factors. It can scarcely be doubted that the need is determined first and the
population factor added afterward in a belief that it is necessary for con-
stitutionality.
66 The constitutionality of only a few legalizing acts have been questioned.
See, Kelly v. State, 92 Ind. 236 (1883), Johnson v. Wells Co., 107 Ind. 15, 8
N. E. 1 (1886); Woods v. McCay, 144 Ind. 316, 43 N. E. 269 (1895), Cf.
Mitchell v. McCorkle, 69 Ind. 184 (1879).
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of the legislative output special and local in character, it was
not surprising that the convention determined "to prevent the
legislature from spending its time upon little matters."'67
To accomplish this purpose it was suggested that local legis-
lative matters be decided by local legislatures. Delegates
from New England familiar with the town meeting system
urged its adoption. Political faith, as well as experience, com-
mended this view. "The further you remove the power of
legislation from the individual," asserted Mr. Owen, "the
more it is liable to abuse. The less you remove it the bet-
ter." 68  Likewise, Mr. Chapman urged that the convention
"either confer the power upon the county boards to legisla-
ture for county purposes or else authorize the legislature to
pass general laws to be applicable only when adopted by the
constitutional authorities of the several counties. '" 69
For these men the evil of special legislation was not so
much its pettiness but the deprivation of local autonomy.
Another group of delegates, however, would hear nothing
of such a system. "To delegate legislative power to county
boards," they said "will be to create ninety little legislatures.
If one legislature has made so many odious local laws, how
many more of such laws will be made by ninety such legis-
latures." 70  They said "all that is needed is a board of com-
missioners to administer the laws as the legislature shall make
them." 71  Thoroughly antagonistic to the New Englanders
viewpoint, this group nevertheless considered the necessity of
limiting special legislation. And so, with little or no opposi-
tion, these provisions became a part of the Constitution.
67 2 Ind. Const. Debates, at 1766.
68 Ibid., at 1769.
60 Ibid., at 1421. Also at 1422 be observed "one thing is very certain, and
it was that, in New England, where from time immemorial the power of local
legislation had been conferred upon county boards, it had been found to
work well . . . Laws passed by the legislature should be general and
only touch upon great leading points; that they should work out boundaries
within which these county boards should legislate."
7O Ibid., Mr. Pettit at 1767.
71 Ibid., at 1801.
193
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The preceding pages have illustrated the mechanical and
yet mystical numerology with which the court has applied
these constitutional sanctions. A fuller consideration of the
arguments advanced for the adoption of this provision seems
to disclose a more substantial basis for judicial treatment.
The predicate of the constitutional debates was the proper
adjustment of the state-local government relation. Every
one agreed that an excess of local legislation whether adopted
by the state or by local bodies should be prevented "so that
wherever a man treads the soil of Indiana he shall have the
same rights and privileges, and shall be governed by the same
laws.' '72 In other words there might have been no objection
to "corporate by-laws" which adjusted local governmental
affairs so long as they did not effect government-individual
relations. 73
In this is the suggestion that it was not special legislation,
as such, which was objected to, but special legislation which
either (1) made the duties and responsibilities of the citizen
dependent upon local determination, and (2) permitted local
prejudice to nullify state policy. These concepts form the
nucleus for a "due process" supervision of the inter-govern-
mental relations between the state, its subdivisions, and its
citizens. The use of such a substantive standard would pre-
vent, it is believed, many of the conflicts which now plague
judicial equanimity. And yet without departing from these
present decisions this may be accomplished. Numerous cases,
under the doctrine of classification, have discussed the effect
if not the propriety of local as against state regulation. The
same precedent, thus, exists for a substantive rather than a
formal interpretation of the constitutional provisions.
The court thus might take the position that if a special act
interfered with local autonomy, the presumption would be
72 Ibid., at 1767.
73 Ibid., Mr. Kelso at p. 1770 "There are some very good local laws that
ought to be continued in existence; and if the state generally is not willing to
adopt them, those who have long tried them ought to have an opportunity of
retaining them."
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against its validity. This on the theory that those who ex-
pressed the New England viewpoint spoke for the convention.
On the other hand, the court might accept the uniformity
theory and interpret the constitutional provision so as to
stimulate state wide policy enunciation and discourage local
variation. Thus they might interpret liberally all acts creat-
ing general or wide spread state control, and those special
acts which did not impinge upon the generality of state policy,
but interpret restrictively all acts which tended to interfere
with the generality of state wide policies or to destroy uni-
form state administration. Precedent for this interpreta-
tion is found in a host of interstate commerce decisions. 74
The difficulty, of course, is that in the conflict between the
mores of state and local control there cannot be a single
continuous policy in favor of the one rather than the other.
The policy must vary with the cases. But this is inevitable.
Each case requires an analysis of the legislation, the condi-
tions of the community, and the policy of the state. In short,
the questions which seem superficially to be questions of con-
stitutional compliance, become almost immediately questions
of legislative policy. If the court is going to insist upon judi-
74 Ibid., Mr. Pettit at 1801. "There will be no publication of the laws
passed by these county boards, but they will remain in the order books of the
county commissioners. They will remain silent as a tomb and become a
dead letter. There will arise a conflict between the sovereign legislature
and the legislatures of the counties." See also, "We cannot afford to let the
inhabitants of Little Pedlington suffer the penalties of their own ignorance
or their own parsimony, because the consequences fall, not on them alone, but
also upon the neighboring districts, upon everyone who passes through their be-
nighted area. . . . We see this clearly enough when it is a question of
infectious disease. . If they are permitted to bring up their children in
ignorance, to let them be enfeebled by neglected ailments, and to suffer them
to be demoralized by evil courses, it is not the Little Pedlingtonites alone who
will have to bear the inevitable cost of the destitution and criminality thus
produced." Webb, supra note 64, at 23.
75 See, McCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L. ed. 579 (1819);
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 43 Sup. Ct. 597 (1923); Indian Motor-
cycle Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 570, 51 Sup. Ct. 601 (1931); North
Dakota v. Olson, 33 F. (2d) 848 (1929); Black and White Taxicab & Transfer
Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U. S. 518, 48 Sup. Ct.
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cial review, then, it seems only proper that it face directly the
policy question and decide it as adequately as possible. Ad-
mittedly this comes close to the review of political questions,
but so does every due process determination. In a sense
this is only making a determination of fitness of inter-govern-
mental relations. This practice is familiar enough in the
federal system.7 That the question is quasi-political has not
been particularly disturbing to the federal court.
The judicial adoption of a substantive test of compliance
would have far-reaching consequences in the legislature. Im-
mediately, a more precise and more orderly method for the
consideration of special legislation would be necessary.
Granted legislative conscientiousness, there still is opportunity
for improvement in legislative techniques and procedure. The
adoption of a special technique for the consideration of special
legislation would transfer the presumption against special
legislation from the courts to the legislature. It is here that
the presumption belongs. And if the substantive test would
produce a profound effect upon legislative procedure, the re-
sultant legislature procedure would, in all probability, have
equally important repercussions in the courts. As the legis-
lative procedure becomes more scientific, judicial review should
become less necessary.
Numerous states have experimented with particular pro-
cedures for the consideration of special legislation. The pred-
icates of every special procedure have been scrutiny, cost and
publicity. Scrutiny has been accomplished through limitations
on the introduction of local or special acts so as to reduce
the possibility of late introduction and last-minute adoption. 6
The filing of the special act with the Clerk of the House in
advance of the convening of the legislature not only assists
the legislature but also puts the community on notice. Some
409 (1928), Missouri v. Hallond, 252 U. S. 416, 40 Sup. Ct. 382 (1920);
Hommer v. Dagenkort, 247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529 (1917) ; Bailey v. Drexel
Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20, 42 Sup. Ct. 449 (1921), A. L. A Scheckter Poultry
Corp v. United States, 55 Sup. Ct. 836 (1935).
76 Ala. Const., sec. 106, Okla. Const., Art. V, sec. 32.
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states, with additional caution, require the publication and
posting of the special act in the local community itself.77
In England, a substantial filing fee is required. 78 Its pur-
pose is not only to defray expenses contingent upon the trial
of the special act, but also as a means of discouraging trivial
requests. Cost as a deterrent, however, can not be too un-
equivocally recommended, for if the request is locally im-
portant (though not necessarily worthy), it will be important
enough so that special interests will expend the necessary
sums. Thus, it is questionable whether the protections gained
by cost, publicity, and notice are of great value, for as John
Curran observed "It is the common fate of the indolent to
see their rights become a prey to the active. The condition
upon which God hath given liberty to man is eternal vigilance;
which condition if he break, servitude is at once the conse-
quence of his crime and the punishment of his guilt." 719
A legislative procedure which would give thorough and im-
partial consideration to the merits of special legislation * * *
prior to enactment, would provide a more real protection
against the abuses of special interests. Parliament has found
such a procedure effective.8 0
The introduction of a private bill into Parliament is al-
ways accomplished by petition with bill attached, offered by
77 See, Ark. Coast., Art. V, sec. 26, Ga. Const. 3.7.16, La. Const., see. 50;
N. C. Coast, Art II, sec. 12; Tex. Coast. Art. III, see. 57; Fla. Coast., Art. III,
sec. 21; Pa. Stat. (Purdon's edition, 1936), Title 46, see. 181. No local or
special bill shall be passed unless notice of the intention to apply therefor
shall be published in the locality where the matter or thing to be affected
may be situated, which notice shall state specifically the title and objects of
the bill, and shall be published by not less than four insertions in at least
two daily or weekly newspapers, one of which may be in a language other
than English, once a week for four consecutive weeks, the first insertion to
be at least thirty days prior to and within three months immediately preceding
the introduction of such bill and be signed by at least one of the parties
applying therefor.
78See Landers' Private Bills, p. 6; Standing Orders Relative to Private
Business of the House of Commons (1928).
70 Speech upon the Right of Election, 1790 (Speeches. Dublin, 1808).
80 Supra, n. 83. See also Private Bill Reports (Eyre and Spattiswoods,
London, 1899).
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a Parliamentary agent. The petition must be presented to
the House before the convening of Parliament. In addition,
the proposed bill must be advertised in the London Gazette
and at least twice during two consecutive weeks in the county
which the bill effects. These notices must contain all the
particulars and describe all of the provisions that are to be
entered in the final bill. Similar notices must be served on all
persons whose property is subject to acquisition or who have
an interest which will be adversely effected by the proposed
bill. Before the 30th of November, plans, maps, estimates,
statements, and the deposit of certain costs must be made.
Before the bill will be considered, it must be certified by
the Examiners (one appointed by each House). Certification
must indicate compliance with the Standing Orders affecting
the form and manner of presenting private bills. If objec-
tions are filed, the proponents of the bill must file a statement
of proofs which may be supported either by deposition or
oral testimony. If compliance is proven, the bill proceeds on
its legislative course.
Before the special committee on private bills the propon-
ents must next present briefs of argument or orally argue
their case. The procedure before committees is largely gov-
erned by the Standing Orders. Private persons are not en-
titled to appear before the committee except as called. All
evidence concerning the bill is taken before the committee and
is never taken to the House itself. In both Houses a special
committee of referees consider and pass upon the interest of
each person opposing a bill and determine his qualifications.
Actual committee hearings are essentially judicial in char-
acter. The allegations of need for special legislation set forth
in the preamble must be proved to be true in fact. If the
bill is opposed, one of the opponents must produce a certifi-
cate that he has entered an appearance upon the petition and
is entitled to be heard. The opponents of the bill may appear
only by Parliamentary agent, and proponents may appear
either personally or by counsel. The committee examines
witnesses according to the rules of evidence customary in judi-
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cial tribunals. Indeed, there is some tendency to insist on
even greater surveillance of testimony in the committee than
in the courts. The committee on opposed bills proceeds first
to a consideration of the truth of the allegations contained in
the preamble of the act. Inasmuch as the House has already
assumed the truth of the preamble when it acquiesces in the
bill the opponent can not attack the preamble unless he speci-
fically affirms his intentions in his petition. In striking con-
trast to American procedure at the conclusion of evidence the
committee room is cleared of all persons, and the committee
proceeds to consider the question, has the preamble been
proved.
If the bill is unopposed, it is submitted to a committee on
unopposed bills, and though the bill be unopposed, the com-
mittee nevertheless demands the presentation of full and com-
plete evidence on the necessity and expedience of the proposed
measure. Consequently, private measures do not, as is often
the case in this country, become laws merely through lack of
opposition. After consideration by the committee on unop-
posed bills, the bill, if favorably received, is submitted to
the House, and there, save in special instances, the commit-
tee's determination is adopted.
This procedure might provide the basis for a similar but
perhaps simpler special legislation procedure in Indiana.
Vigilance, inspection, and distrust are the cardinal virtues of
the system. Courageously administered, it should remove
the remaining vestige of meretricious special legislation. A
simplified English system is used in Massachusetts, and while
it has not reduced the bulk of special legislation,"' it has made
for an orderly legislative procedure.
81 Indeed, it appears in Massachusetts the presumption is in favor of special
acts and against general acts. "If, in their opinion (opinion of Counsel to
the Senate and House), the necessity of enacting special bills in relation to any
particular subject of legislation may, without detriment to the public interest,
be avoided in whole or in part by the enactment of general legislation, they
shall from time to time submit to the general court drafts of such changes in
or additions to the General Laws as will accomplish said purpose." 1930
Mass. Acts c. 6. See also, Mass. Gen. Court Joint Rules of the two
Branches, sees. 7-8.
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Maryland has placed a condition subsequent upon the oper-
ation of its special legislation. There are no restrictions on
adoption, and the practice permits the enactment of prac-
tically every special bill. S2  But after adoption, the act may
be attacked by referendum. The history of referendums in
Maryland, however, suggests the inaccuracy of the theory
that special legislation gives to a local community that which
the local community wants. Almost all of the acts presented
for referendum have been rejected by the voters of the local
community. 3 Perhaps the next step should be taken and sub-
sequent to enactment but prior to enforcement require adop-
tion by the local community.84
A survey of the several legislative and judicial procedures
suggest: (1) an inadequacy of legislative investigation and
consideration of the need and effect of special acts (2) a will-
ingness to determine that general laws are not applicable (3)
an inconsistency in the policy of judicial review (4) the appli-
cation of a wholly inadequate standard (population) for the
determination of the generality of legislation. A special legis-
lative procedure for local and private bills and, if judicial
review is necessary, a substantive standard to determine con-
stitutional compliance seem necessary if Indiana special legis-
lation is to have either science or predicability.
Special and local bills should contain preambles or recitals
82 ,,. speaking, generally, the individual senator and the local dele-
gation in the House is left remarkably free to take care of local measures.
. . 'If Alleghany County wants it, let her have it.' is the prevailing
feeling." Winslow, "State Legislative Committees" (Johns Hopkins Press,
Baltimore, 1931), p. 117.
83 "Presumably Anne Arundel County gets by way of local legislation what
Anne Arundel County wants. But . Out of twenty county measures re-
ferred by petition in four elections, eighteen were rejected, usually by over-
whelming votes." Winslow, supra, n. 81 at 138.
84 The system of local option though not successful particularly in liquor
control, might be found more effective in situations more definitely local in
character. The theory of "home rule" charter does not differ essentially from
"local option". "To grant special legislation in such cases may be advisable,
but to grant a reasonable degree of home rule would not only accomplish the
same results, but would relieve the general assembly of a large number of
bills that regularly take up its time." 14 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 423.
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setting forth the facts of need, the ,costs, and consequences
of the proposed law. A special committee 5 should hear in
the manner of a tribunal the proof of these recitals. A pro-
cedure which would prevent bills from being enacted through
lack of opposition should be adopted. 8 The bill as finally
adopted should contain findings of fact as reliable as judicial
records. The presumption (if any should exist) against
special legislation should thus be resolved legislatively.
Such a legislative procedure would put an end to much
spurious and deceptive numerological identification of cities
and counties. The validity of enactment would depend upon
dependable determinations of fact. If there were need for
judicial activity it would be in the broader, more significant
field of substance. The entire special legislation conflict is
but a manifestation of the larger struggle between the forces
of centralized government and the forces of local autonomy
and decentralization. Judicial treatment of this problem
would be particularly helpful in adjusting the many difficulties
that arise between special legislation, "home rule" amend-
ments, the general municipal regulation. And though the
85 This practice has become rather widespread in the case of the com-
mittee on claims, a committee dealing with special private legislation. Indeed,
in some states the committee eventually evolves into a "legislative court."
See, Iowa, Joint Rules of Senate and House (Iowa Official Register, 1930),
No. 18. "It shall be the duty of the committee on claims in each house to
keep a book of record, in which shall be entered each claim for money against
the state referred to them, whether presented in favor of private persons or
municipal or other corporations, entering therein the name of the claimant, the
amount of the claim, the grounds therefor, with note of the evidence offered
in support of the same, and the final conclusion of the committee thereon.
At the close of the session said book of record shall be deposited with the
auditor of state, to be kept by him, and he shall provide an index showing the
names of the claimants recorded therein. At any subsequent session the same
shall be delivered, when desired, to the like committee having jurisdiction of
such claims and shall always be open to the examination of the said committee
of either house.
86 See, Landers, Private Bills, supra, n. 83.
87 "He has spent all his life in letting down empty buckets into empty
wells; and he is frittering away his age in trying to draw them up again."
Smith, 1 Lady Hollands Memories 259.
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abandonment of a mechanical concept of the constitutional
prohibition for a substantive regulatory concept would no
doubt create new and difficult interpretative problems, it is
nevertheless believed that such a standard, legislatively and
judicially held, would aid fundamentally the adjustment of
the state-local government relation.
